Eight years have now gone by since the 20th Congress of the CPSU touched off the momentous struggle between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, and nearly four since the conflict passed—in the spring of 1960—from the stage of concealed behind-the-scenes argumentation and veiled public criticism to that of open vituperation. Looking back over the whole course of events, particularly in the light of what both sides revealed during 1963 of their past confidential dealings, one is struck above all by the continuity and steady growth of the conflict. Despite periodic lulls in the intensity of its public expression, the Sino-Soviet struggle has gone on unceasingly since 1956, and each successive year has brought important new developments—some publicly known at the time, others not—which progressively expanded and exacerbated it.

From the beginning, the struggle has been fundamentally a dispute over authority: since 1956, over the authority to define (and redefine) the proper relationships between the CPSU and other bloc Communist parties; since 1957, over the authority to fix unified policy lines for the bloc and the international Communist movement; and, since 1958 particularly, over the authority to determine whose national interests—Moscow’s or Peking’s—should be accorded greater weight in the formulation of Communist policy. Conflicts of national interest between the disputants have involved such questions as whether the Soviet Union should assist Communist China to attain a nuclear capability; what risks the USSR should be willing to take in order to support Chinese Communist ambitions regarding Taiwan; the desirability of moves to reduce tensions with the United States; how far the Communist bloc should go in encouraging and backing revolutionary armed struggles in underdeveloped areas; and what attitude should be taken towards “national-bourgeois” regimes in these areas, especially where—as in India—the regime appears hostile to Chinese Communist but not to Soviet interests.

Beginning of the Chinese Challenge

While it is appropriate to trace the Sino-Soviet struggle from the 20th CPSU Congress, which Peking now claims to have been its starting point, it should be noted that the CCP had already had
important policy disagreements with Stalin before, during and after its advent to power in 1949. The point, however, is that not until Stalin’s death did the Chinese party dare to make such conflicts the occasion for challenging the authority and prerogatives of the CPSU—and eventually denying them altogether. It so happened that the first new policy divergence of importance following Stalin’s death arose with the 20th Congress and the positions it took regarding the Stalin cult and the possibility of “peaceful transitions” to socialism. Confronted once again, as it had been in the past, with Soviet decisions of policy with which it strongly disagreed, the CCP leadership now for the first time felt itself in a position to press for their modification and, in so doing, to contest the paramount authority of the Soviet party.

In its major statement on the dispute last September, the CCP referred back to its April 1956 pronouncement “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (Jen-min Jih-pao, April 5, 1956) as having “tactfully but unequivocally criticized the erroneous propositions of the 20th Congress.” This pronouncement did, in fact, seek to define Mao’s own position in the Chinese party by revising what the CCP regarded as the one-sided appraisal of Stalin at the congress, at the same time presenting a Marxist “explanation” of how Stalin’s “mistakes” had occurred and how they could be prevented from recurring in the future. In brief, the CCP held that Stalin had indeed committed “serious mistakes,” but that his merits were more important; that his errors had reflected contradictions “between the individual and the collective in a socialist society”; and that such contradictions, although they might recur, could be minimized, and mistakes averted, if the “leaders of Communist parties and socialist states” exercised sufficient prudence.

This document, representing the first in a long series of Chinese efforts to correct the errant CPSU and provide guidance for all those who had heretofore looked to Moscow for direction, made an immediate and widespread impression in the international Communist movement. Moreover, the Chinese disclosed last September that they had followed up the April 1956 pronouncement with a series of private protests conveyed by Mao, Liu Shao-ch’i, and Chou En-lai in conversations with Soviet leaders in Moscow and Peking in April, October and November 1956, and January 1957. In these talks, according to the Chinese, they maintained that “the basic policy and line during the period when Stalin was in power were correct,” and that the CPSU leadership had shown a “total lack of overall analysis” of Stalin, a “lack of self-criticism,” and (apparently most serious of all in Peking’s view) a “failure to consult with the fraternal parties in advance.”

### The East European Crises

Besides questioning the propriety of the Soviet repudiation of Stalin, the CCP apparently undertook to intervene directly in Moscow’s relations with its East European satellites before and during the crises of late 1956. Chinese statements and credible press reports at the time indicated that the Peking leadership gave support to the Polish Communist demands for greater autonomy from Moscow and the Chinese have charged in their more recent statements on the dispute that the Soviet Union “committed the error of great power chauvinism . . . by moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force,” intimating that the CCP had then stepped in to warn Moscow against using force. At the same time, the Chinese claim that it was also they who pressured the CPSU into abandoning an altogether different sort of “grave error” in the handling of the Hungarian revolt. The Peking statement of last September says:

> At the critical moment when the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied Budapest, it [the CPSU] intended for a time to adopt a policy of capitulation and to abandon socialist Hungary to counterrevolution . . . We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the

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1. Editorial article simultaneously published in central CCP daily Jen-min Jih-pao (People’s Daily) and monthly Hung Ch’i (Red Flag), Sept. 6, 1963. (Hereafter cited as JMJP-HC joint editorial.)
2. For example, such a usually loyal CPSU supporter as the late Ajoy Ghosh, then Secretary-General of Indian CP, told the Fourth CPI Congress that the Chinese statement was the most satisfactory one he had ever seen. See “Report of Ajoy Ghosh to the Fourth CPI Congress,” in Democratic Research Service brochure Communist Double Talk at Palghat, Bombay, 1956, pp. 117-26.
3. JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963, states: “We insisted that in the handling of problems between fraternal parties and countries, correct principles should be followed so as to strengthen the unity of the Socialist camp, and we firmly opposed the erroneous methods of great power chauvinism” (Emphasis added.) Such Chinese action in support of Poland was reported by Sidney Gruson in the New York Times, January 11, 1957.
counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of . . . Hungary.

Although it is quite likely that the Chinese have greatly exaggerated their part in determining the course ultimately taken by the Soviet Union in both the Polish and Hungarian crises, the essential point is that Peking apparently did intervene in an attempt to influence decisions that hitherto had been accepted as Moscow's sole prerogative. Further, the Chinese now claim (since last year) that it was likewise at their suggestion that the Soviet government issued its declaration of October 30, 1956, in which—as the Chinese put it—the Soviet leaders re-examined "some of their own past mistakes in handling their relations with fraternal countries" and recognized the need for "mutual respect," "equality" and "independence" in intra-bloc relations. On November 1, 1956, Peking published a statement supporting the Soviet declaration, but also voicing direct approval of the Polish Communist position and warning against further manifestations of "great power chauvinism."

In their statements last year, the Chinese piously professed to be saddened by the fact that the actions they took in 1956 in the best interests of communism had caused the Soviet leadership to "nurse rancor against us" and to regard the CCP as its "biggest obstacle." That such rancor arose was hardly surprising, however, in view of the fact that Peking was now asserting its independent right to provide doctrinal guidance to the Communist world, to judge the propriety of Soviet policy innovations, and even to prescribe the correct framework of relationships between the USSR and other members of the Communist bloc.

Mao at Moscow, 1957

At the conference of Communist leaders held in Moscow in November 1957, with Mao himself attending as chief spokesman for the CCP, the Chinese vigorously renewed their efforts to shape overall Communist policy, although with a perceptible shift in direction. Whereas in 1956 Peking had stressed autonomy and inveighed against "great power chauvinism," its representatives now urged unity and deference to the leading role of the Soviet Union. Speaking publicly at Moscow University on November 17, Mao declared that "the socialist camp must have a head and this head is the USSR," and that "the Communist parties of all countries must have a head and this head is the CPSU."

It is now clear from the information made public by Peking last year that Mao's attendance at the Moscow parley followed less than a month after the signature of an agreement providing for Soviet assistance to China in the area of "new technology for national defense." Hence, the Chinese leader's insistence upon a special status for the CPSU, together with the strong Chinese stand taken in the conference against revisionism and emphasizing the value of Soviet experience for all members of the bloc, may well have been partly intended as a repayment by Peking for the military aid agreement. However, it seems equally likely that the Chinese position on bloc unity and doctrinal orthodoxy was, in any case, a necessary complement to the CCP's effort at the Moscow meeting to force acceptance of a more vigorous and aggressive Communist strategy towards the West in the light of Soviet weapons developments. In 1963 Moscow and Peking published differing versions of portions of Mao's conference speech dealing with this point, but both versions indicated that the Chinese leader had sought to impress upon the delegates that nuclear war was neither so likely, nor its consequences—if it came—so unacceptable, as to justify Communist hesitancy to adopt a more militant international policy.

Thus, the Chinese line at the 1957 conference by no means signified Peking's submission to CPSU discipline or Soviet policy dictates. On the contrary, Mao apparently insisted upon the prerogatives of a king-maker. While publicly proclaiming the USSR and CPSU to be the "center" and "head" of world communism, he met privately with Soviet party leaders and—so the Chinese claim—"where necessary and appropriate, waged struggle against them in order to help them correct their errors." Prominent among the errors which Mao "struggled" to correct, according to the Chinese, was the CPSU's draft of the passage in the conference resolution relating to the modes of acquiring power. The Chinese claim that this

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1 JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963. This statement indicates elsewhere that Liu Shao-ch'i had "conversations" with Soviet Communist party leaders sometime during October 1956.

draft "said not a word about non-peaceful transition [to power], mentioning only peaceful transition" and emphasizing the "parliamentary road." They admit that they did not obtain everything they wished, but claim to have forced the Soviets to accept counterbalancing phrases on the possibility of "non-peaceful transition" which were embodied in a joint CPSU-CCP draft declaration and later incorporated in the published conference resolution.

The CCP also claims that it succeeded in wresting other concessions from the CPSU at the 1957 meeting, and certain of these testify to Peking’s desire at the time for a harsher bloc foreign policy. Notably, Peking asserts that its representatives secured additions to the conference resolution embodying the notions that “US imperialism is the center of world reaction and the sworn enemy of the people,” and that “if imperialism should unleash a world war, it would doom itself to destruction.”

New Areas of Friction

In 1958 the Sino-Soviet struggle took on broader dimensions as new conflicts of national interest arose on several fronts. The three most important matters at issue were the military relationship between the two powers, the related question of Soviet conduct during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and Peking’s radical new economic programs and the claims associated with them.

On the military issue, Peking’s statement of last September, though not saying so explicitly, seeks to convey the impression that the Soviet Union, in the October 1957 defense assistance agreement, gave a firm commitment to help China attain an atomic weapons capability. This appears doubtful, however, particularly in view of the campaign launched by the CCP in the summer of 1958 against Chinese military leaders charged with overemphasizing the importance of both atomic weapons and outside aid. The same Chinese statement further alleges that sometime (unspecified) in 1958 “the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control,” and that these demands were “firmly rejected by the Chinese government.” It is conceivable that the demands were linked by the Soviets to the question of atomic assistance to China, and that they were advanced by Khrushchev when he visited Peking in early August, at which time Soviet military assistance was reportedly discussed in the context of China’s requirements for the impending Taiwan Straits venture. In any event, the absence of any Soviet agreement to supply nuclear weapons to China was suggested shortly after Khrushchev’s departure by an article in the CCP organ In the joint editorial of September 6, 1963.

If the Chinese were embittered by the evident Soviet reluctance to satisfy them in regard to the sharing of the USSR’s nuclear might, that bitterness was further intensified by the hesitant backing China received from Moscow in the ensuing crisis in the Taiwan Straits. Confronted by American nuclear power, Peking apparently sought to obtain an early public commitment by the Soviet Union that would enable it to face down the United States and thus would make feasible Chinese military action to “liberate” the offshore islands. The Chinese government statement of September 1, 1963, charged that the Soviet Union had perfidiously withheld such a commitment until Moscow was sure that it could be given without risk—in other words, until it was too late to be of any assistance to the original Chinese goal.

The slow and deliberate course taken by Moscow in the Taiwan Straits crisis does, indeed, suggest that the Soviet leadership feared the possibility of being dragged into a nuclear conflict with the United States as a result of precipitate Chinese action taken in pursuit of interests not shared by the USSR. This interpretation would appear to derive support from the Chinese claim made last September (denied, unconvincingly, by Moscow) that Khrushchev, in his talks with Mao at Peking in October 1959, sought to remove Taiwan as “an incendiary factor in the international situation” by hinting that Peking ought to accept a “two-Chinas” solution. At the same time, it seems likely that the Chinese Communist challenge to the United States in 1958 further reinforced Soviet reluctance to assist China in acquiring nuclear weapons.

A third new area of friction developed in connection with the radical turn in Chinese domestic policy during 1958, manifested in the

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* JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.
launching of the communes program and the economic "Great Leap Forward." Chinese spokes-
men exuberantly claimed that the communes, with their system of partial distribution according to need, contained "shoots" of communism, signi-
ifying that the final attainment of communism in China was no longer far off; that they repre-
sented an unprecedented achievement as well as a useful model for other countries. In these claims and the policies of the "Great Leap" as a whole, the CPSU saw a new and dangerous Chinese chal-
denge to its leadership of the Communist world. As a Soviet comment stated in 1968, "things were depicted as though only they (the Chinese) were really engaged in communist construction, leaving other countries behind," and the Chinese leaders tried to present their "totally unsound and harmful policy . . . as an objective law" and "as a pre-
scription or recipe for other countries."9

According to one of the official Soviet state-
ments issued last fall, Khrushchev personally pro-
tested these "innovations" in his talks with Mao in early August 1958.10 For some time afterwards, however, the Soviet leaders continued to ignore the communes publicly, although their attitude was reflected in Soviet press comments criticizing the lack of material incentives characteristic of the commune system and emphasizing that the attainment of full communism required a level of production which was much closer to realization in the Soviet Union than in Communist China. Later, as the Sino-Soviet rift widened and as deteriorating economic conditions in China forced abandonment of the communes in all but name, Khrushchev repeatedly gibed at the Chinese with thinly-veiled references to Communist leaders who had become "estranged from the masses," disobedient "children" who had "burned their fingers," and to the fatuity of those who desired "pantless communism."

**Widening of the Breach**

The year 1959 saw the deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations proceed at a markedly faster pace as dissensions over Soviet moves toward an easing of tensions with the United States and over Communist China's involvement in a border conflict with India still further widened the gap between the two Communist powers.

Moscow's intent to pursue more vigorously the "peaceful coexistence" strategy towards the West was signalled in January by Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's exploratory visit to the United States, and was underlined later the same month by the ruling handed down by the 21st CPSU Congress that war between the capital and socialist states not only was not in-
evitable but might even be permanently avoided while capitalism still remained. Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his meeting with Presi-
dent Eisenhower followed in the fall, while Soviet propaganda during and after the visit took the softest line towards the West that it had displayed since World War II—or has taken since.

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**WHO TOLD WHOM SO?**

In the United States I was asked many questions about the relations between the Sovi-
et Union and China. I must assume that these questions derived from the revisionist anti-
Chinese propaganda in the Yugoslav press which recently . . . published insinuations about incipient disagreements, if you please, between the Soviet Union and China. . . .

I replied that the gentlemen questioners were evidently dreaming sweet dreams in which, lo and behold, magic could cause disagreements to appear in the socialist camp between the Soviet Union and China. But I said that . . .

the dream was unrealizable. Soviet-Chinese friendship rests on the unshakable foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the common goals of communism, on the fraternal and mutual support of the peoples of our coun-
tries, on joint struggles against imperialism and for peace and socialism. (Applause)

The greetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to our Congress, signed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, . . . are a reaffirmation of the eternal, indissoluble friend-
ship between our parties and between our countries. (Applause) We shall cherish this friendship as the apple of our eye. Our friend-
ship is a sacred thing, and let not those who would seek to defile it reach out with unclean hands for this purpose. (Applause)

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8 Ekonomicheskaia gazeta (Moscow), Sept. 28, 1963.
All this was naturally anathema to Peking, which considered the United States the principal obstacle to its ambitions in Asia and viewed the exertion of maximum Communist revolutionary pressure against the US in all parts of world as essential to China's national interests. Accordingly, Chinese Communist propaganda in the fall of 1959, while paying lip service to the principle of "peaceful coexistence," became more and more shrill in its warnings against perfidious American intentions to use negotiations and a relaxation of international tensions as a "smokescreen" to lull the peoples of the world into a false sense of security and thus facilitate US "aggression" against the national liberation movements in underdeveloped areas.

Other Soviet actions during the year aggravated old Chinese grievances or created new ones. Speaking publicly on July 18 at Poznan, Poland, Khrushchev—without referring to China by name—recalled the failure of the Soviet experiment with communes during the period of "war communism" and remarked that those who had wished to set them up "had a poor understanding of what communism is and how it is to be built." Inasmuch as the CCP Central Committee was at that very moment meeting at Lushan to re-examine the communes program, Khrushchev's comment was regarded by the Chinese as a gratuitous attempt to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. There is also reason to suspect that the Soviets tried to intervene more directly by encouraging Chinese Communist Defense Minister Marshal P'eng Te-huai, during his visit to Eastern Europe in the spring of 1959, to oppose Maoist policies. It is believed that P'eng did challenge Mao's program at the Lushan meeting, and that this was responsible for his dismissal shortly thereafter, in September 1959.

Meanwhile, Moscow continued to turn a deaf ear to Chinese appeals for assistance in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. According to the CCP, the Soviet Union in June 1959 finally rejected Peking's request that China be provided with "a sample of an atomic bomb" and thereby "unilaterally tore up" the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement concerning "new technology for national defense."

On top of all this, the refusal of the Soviet leadership to stand beside Communist China in her border conflict with non-socialist, bourgeois India was viewed in Peking as an outright betrayal of the obligations of "proletarian internationalism." Following the outbreak of hostilities in late August, the Soviet government on September 9 issued a public statement taking a neutral stand towards the conflict—this, the Chinese have since claimed, in spite of frantic last-minute efforts by themselves to dissuade Moscow from such action. Not only did Moscow refuse to heed this appeal, but it later accused the Chinese of having deliberately timed their military action against India so as to embarrass Khrushchev on the eve of his trip to the United States.

Khrushchev's visit to Peking at the end of September, on the heels of his US trip, apparently did more to accentuate than to assuage the grievances on both sides. Regarding the Sino-Indian conflict, Peking claims that the Chinese leaders "personally gave Comrade Khrushchev an explanation of the true situation" but that he "did not wish to know the true situation"; on the other hand, according to Moscow, the Soviet leader took the occasion to warn the Chinese that their course of action was "fraught with negative consequences not only for Sino-Indian relations, but also for the entire international situation." It was also at this time, as noted earlier, that Khrushchev allegedly suggested to Mao the desirability of accepting a two-Chinas solution of the Taiwan problem. Moreover, the Soviet leader further outraged his hosts by warning them, in a public address on September 30, against "testing by force the stability of the capitalist system."

The War of Words

As the Chinese saw it, Khrushchev's actions during 1959 had set virtually a new record of error and betrayal: he had rebuffed them on the question of atomic military assistance, sought to

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11 In 1963, statements by Chilean and Costa Rican Communists alleged that CCP leaders had once told Latin American Communists visiting China that international tension was useful for the furtherance of revolutionary struggles. According to the Chileans, this statement was made early in 1959.

12 Khrushchev's speech was simultaneously reported in Prawda (Moscow), Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), and by the Soviet radio on July 21, after an unusual three-day delay.


15 Article just cited claims that the Soviet charge was made in February 1960 in a private "verbal notification" to the CCP Central Committee. The Soviet government statement of Sept. 20, 1963, and other Soviet statements last year repeated the charge publicly.
interfere in Chinese internal affairs, hobnobbed with the leaders of "US imperialism," betrayed them in the Sino-Indian conflict, intimated that they should renounce their claim to Taiwan, and upbraided them publicly for their domestic and foreign policies. It is little wonder, therefore, that in April 1960 the CCP unleashed a massive propaganda assault aimed at the policies—and, implicitly, the authority—of the Soviet Communist Party.

Central to the many indirect but unmistakable indictments of Khrushchev's policies published in the leading organs of the CCP was the contention that the peaceful coexistence line as applied by the Soviet party was eroding the militancy of revolutionaries throughout the world. Now, for the first time, the Chinese systematically elaborated their objections to the arguments that the advent of nuclear weapons necessitated a change in Communist revolutionary strategy, that local wars involving the great powers would inevitably lead to world war, and that revolutionary armed struggles should not be so vigorously cultivated as to create a danger of nuclear conflict. While it was possible that world war could be averted, the Chinese contended, local anti-colonial or anti-imperialist wars of liberation could not, and the Communist policy should be to encourage and support such struggles without being inhibited by exaggerated fears of nuclear destruction or by a misguided desire to facilitate negotiations with the capitalist West.

Soon after the CCP campaign began, the position of the CPSU to defend its policies against the Chinese criticisms was measurably weakened as a result of the Soviet decision to publicly exploit the U-2 incident of May 1 whereas previous overflights had been ignored. This decision set in motion a train of events which apparently led the Soviet leadership to conclude, after anguished debate, that it would be politically harmful, in view of the Chinese offensive, to allow the scheduled summit conference with the Western leaders at Paris to take place. There is now substantive evidence that the CPSU leaders had the Chinese very much on their minds during the 16-day interval between the U-2 incident and Khrushchev's dynamiting of the summit parley. The Soviet party disclosed in April last year that on May 12, 1960—four days before the Paris meeting was to begin—Mao had been urgently invited to come to Moscow, but had refused. Instead, on May 14, he made his first officially reported statement in two years, in which he professed to support a summit meeting but simultaneously gloated over the U-2 incident and implicitly taunted Khrushchev for having displayed "illusions" about imperialism.

In early June the Chinese party carried its fight against the CPSU a step farther by utilizing the opportunity afforded by a meeting of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking to conduct a campaign against the Soviet line among both Communist and non-Communist delegates. Shortly thereafter, according to the Chinese, the CPSU privately proposed to the CCP that steps be taken to organize a conference of all Communist parties for the purpose of ironing out differences, suggesting that a preparatory exchange of views take place in closed multi-party meetings during the impending Romanian party congress.

When the CCP representatives went to Bucharest in the latter part of June, they were shocked to find themselves the target of a "surprise assault" allegedly concocted by the CPSU in order to browbeat them into submission. Khrushchev, according to the Chinese, first circulated a CPSU letter to the CCP, dated June 21, which attacked the Chinese party "all along the line." Then, in their speeches to the congress, Khrushchev and his supporters among the East European party leaders denounced the Chinese as Trotskyites and "madmen" seeking war, and further accused them of pursuing a selfishly "nationalistic" course in the Sino-Indian border conflict. The Soviet leader is also alleged to have belittled Chinese military knowledge and the militia system, and to have criticized the purge of Marshal P'eng Te-huai. The CCP delegation, according to Peking, responded to the attacks with a "tit-for-tat struggle" and distributed a written statement of defiance at the close of the congress proceedings.

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17 Ibid. Mr. Dulles writes that "there is evidence of long debate in the Presidium during the first two weeks of May" over "whether to push the U-2 issue under the rug or use it to destroy the conference."


20 Mao's statement was made in an interview with Latin American and Japanese visitors at Wuhan on May 14 and released the same day by NCNA. It was also quoted two days later in a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial.

21 JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.
New Soviet acts of retaliation followed soon afterwards. According to the Chinese statements of last September, it was in July 1960 that Moscow "suddenly took a unilateral decision recalling all Soviet experts in China within one month." In addition, the Soviet government unilaterally cancelled the reciprocal publication of friendship magazines in both countries and demanded the recall of a member of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. It also appears from last year's statements by both sides that incidents began occurring on the Sino-Soviet border about this time, each side charging the other with having provoked them.

Meanwhile, the war of words continued with mounting intensity. In early August, Soviet party journals began claiming for the first time that peaceful coexistence represented the general foreign policy line of the entire Communist bloc, thus implicitly asserting the authority of the CPSU to define bloc foreign policy and the obligation of bloc members to accept such definition as a matter of Communist discipline. This was to be a recurrent Soviet motif in the Sino-Soviet polemic of subsequent years, reappearing in periods of Soviet retreat but reappearing when Moscow returned to the attack.

On September 10, the CCP replied to the CPSU letter of June 21 with a letter of rebuttal which called upon Moscow to restore bloc unity by abandoning not only its "erroneous" policy line but all efforts to exert its authority over Peking. That same month a Chinese delegation went to Moscow for fruitless private talks with CPSU leaders, and in Hanoi Soviet and Chinese party representatives again vied for support among the delegates to the Vietnamese party congress.

The 1960 Communist Conference

In October 1960 there was another skirmish between the two antagonists in the 26-party committee which met in Moscow to prepare a draft declaration for submission to the scheduled November conference of Communist parties. Agreement was eventually reached on the bulk of a draft text, but not on certain key issues. In connection with this meeting, the Chinese claimed last September that Khrushchev, upon returning from the United Nations session in New York, "even scrapped agreements that had already been reached on some questions"—suggesting that some of the CPSU leaders were more willing than Khrushchev to make concessions to the Chinese for the sake of unity.

When the conference proper convened, according to Peking, the Soviets again started things off, as at Bucharest, by distributing among the delegates a new 60,000-word CPSU "letter" attacking the CCP (and the Albanian party) "more savagely than ever." In the conference debate also, the Chinese claim, the CPSU mustered its adherents and "engineered converging assaults on the CCP" in an attempt to force it to yield. In the end, an ambiguous document was produced and signed, embodying the mutually contradictory positions of the two parties on many issues. While the CPSU perhaps succeeded in getting more of its points included than did the Chinese, it nevertheless suffered a major defeat on the central issue of authority in that it failed to obtain either a condemnation of (Chinese-Albanian) "factional activities" or an endorsement of the Soviet thesis that peaceful coexistence was the "general line" of bloc foreign policy. The Chinese have since boasted that this was "an event of great historical significance" because it "changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of the errors of the CPSU leadership was tolerated and its word was final."

The signature of the conference declaration was accompanied by the customary public pledges of undying solidarity and mutual affection, but privately neither Moscow nor Peking regarded the compromise as anything but a temporary make-shift, nor did either intend to abandon the struggle. Right after the conference, in fact, Khrushchev's...
shchev renewed his attack on the Chinese position at what he evidently regarded as its weakest point—Albania. The Albanians, who had been the most vociferous supporters of the Chinese at Bucharest and the November Moscow conference, were now subjected to an extension of the Soviet economic pressures that had been initiated in the summer of 1960. These reprisals culminated in the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and the complete termination of Soviet economic aid to Albania in April 1961, followed by the withdrawal of Soviet naval units from Vlore in May. An acrimonious exchange of messages between Moscow and Tirana was climaxèd by a violent letter addressed to the Albanian party by the CPSU Central Committee on August 24, 1961. The Chinese, fully conscious of the fact that the Soviet pressures against Albania were aimed as much against themselves, countered by providing their East European ally with economic aid and technicians to replace those withdrawn by Moscow. Peking has since revealed that the CCP urged the Soviet party early in 1961 to take steps to improve Soviet-Albanian relations, and that it repeated this advice on the eve of the 22nd CPSU Congress in October, and apparently in an effort to head off the all-out Soviet attack on Albania that seemed foreshadowed by the August 24 CPSU letter to Tirana.

The 22nd Congress and After

As events soon proved, however, the Soviet leadership was determined to force the Albanian issue into the open, evidently hoping thereby to recoup the damage done to its authority by the Chinese at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties. Thus, the 22nd Congress witnessed an unprecedented torrent of abuse hurled publicly at the Albanians by CPSU spokesmen, most of all by Khrushchev, who in his speech of October 27 went so far as to call explicitly for the overthrow of Albanian party leaders Hoxha and Shehu.

Besides the assault on the Albanians, there were other moves at the congress which appeared aimed, at least implicitly, at various aspects of the Chinese position. The first was the renewed attack on Stalin, which flouted the position taken by the CCP ever since the 20th Congress. The second was the new, intensified offensive unleashed against the “anti-party group,” and particularly against Molotov, who—it was repeatedly intimated by congress speakers—had been encouraged by the Chinese to attack Khrushchev’s policies on two occasions, once in April 1960 (when Molotov was still ambassador to Outer Mongolia) and again just before the 22nd Congress. The third was the effort to present the new CPSU Program, which the congress was to ratify, as a “new Communist Manifesto” justifying the claim of the Soviet party to world Communist leadership. On top of all this, the Chinese claim that Khrushchev, in his private meetings with Premier Chou En-lai during the congress, “expressed undisguised support for anti-party [i.e., revisionist] elements in the CCP.”

As leader of the Chinese delegation, Chou responded to the Soviet moves by reproving Khrushchev before the congress for his open attack on the Albanian party, by demonstratively laying a wreath on Stalin’s tomb, and by suddenly leaving for Peking before the conclusion of the congress. According to Chinese statements, he also “frankly criticized the errors of the CPSU leadership” in private conversations with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.

Following the congress, the CPSU stepped up its campaign to mobilize the bulk of the world’s Communist parties in a solid front against the Albanians—and hence, implicitly, against the Chinese. Although all the East European parties and some of the non-bloc parties had backed the Soviet attack on Albania at the congress, many of the latter—as well as the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties—had failed to do so. During the next three months, however, in response to evident Soviet pressures, the great majority of the non-Asian Communist parties went on record with some form of rebuke to the Albanians. The Soviet press avidly republished these statements, as it did the statements (after mid-November) of some of the foreign parties mildly but explicitly criticizing the Chinese for opposing criticism of the Albanians. In December, diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tirana were, in effect, ruptured.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist press maintained a spurious Olympian attitude, reprinting both the attacks on Albania and the ferocious Albanian replies—but of course giving greater prominence to the latter. Ample publicity was also

Among the speakers who attacked Molotov were Ilichev, who cited Molotov’s submission of a “dogmatic” article to Kommunist in April 1960; Satyukov and Pospelov, who told of a letter sent by Molotov to the Central Committee on the eve of the 22nd Congress attacking the draft CPSU program in terms similar to those later made explicit by the Chinese; and by Kuusinen, who accused Molotov of fishing in “foreign waters.”

JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.
given to statements by various Asian parties which declined to follow the Soviet lead. The North Vietnamese party, alarmed at the drift of events, took the initiative in January 1962 in privately urging the combatants to agree to the holding of a new world Communist conference "to settle the discord" and in proposing that "pending such a meeting the parties cease attacking one another in the press and over the radio." Similar proposals were put forward, apparently also privately, by the Indonesian party, and publicly by the New Zealand CP.

**Jockeying for Position**

By February 1962 it was evident to the CPSU that its campaign not only had failed to isolate the Albanians and Chinese but even had resulted in setbacks to its position, primarily among the Asian parties but also to some extent elsewhere. On February 21, the Soviet party climaxed its drive with an imposing two-page spread in Pravda summarizing the support it had received, citing Lenin on the necessity of subordination "to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat," and insisting that "only open, uncompromising criticism of the anti-socialist, nationalist actions of the Hoxha-Shehu group can secure the unity of our movement."

The very next day, February 22, the CPSU dispatched a secret letter to Peking which—as discreetly summarized by the Russians last July—"drew the attention of the CCP" to the dangerous consequences of disunity and urged "more effective measures" for coordinating the positions of the two parties in the various world front organizations and elsewhere. According to the more outspoken Chinese summary, the CPSU letter accused the Chinese of taking "a special stand of their own" in opposition to the world movement, "even made a crime" of the CCP's support for the Albanians, and demanded that Peking abandon its position and embrace Moscow's "erroneous line" as "preconditions" for an improvement of Sino-Soviet relations.

In April the CCP replied with a letter favoring a new general conference of Communist parties, concurring with the North Vietnamese proposal for a truce in polemics, and calling for bilateral or multilateral talks to prepare for a world meeting. The Chinese also blandly advised the Soviet party to "take the initiative" in seeking a settlement of its differences with the Albanians. Late in May, the CPSU again returned the ball to Peking with a note which, according to Moscow, reiterated the main points of the February 22 letter. The Soviet party also claimed last year that it had agreed in May 1962 to the convocation of a new Communist conference; but the Chinese assert that the CPSU made an Albanian surrender the "precondition" for such a conference.

Meanwhile, Moscow and Peking seemed to have agreed, at least for the time being, to heed the North Vietnamese appeal and apply the brake to public polemics against each other. Mutual reprimandations were, in fact, greatly toned down during the spring of 1962—although never quite eliminated. Public pronouncements on both sides sought to convey to the West an impression of restored harmony and unity—an effort which, as an American scholar of Communist affairs has noted, was assisted by Communist news correspondents in Moscow, and which was rather naively taken at face value by some sections of the Western press.

Again, the reality was very different. According to the Chinese statement of last September 6, it was precisely during this period of seeming calm (April-May 1962) that "the leaders of the CPSU used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region, and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going into the Soviet Union," subsequently refusing to return them to Chinese territory despite Peking's protests. These events were presumably related to the subsequently reported action of the CPR government closing Soviet consulates in China. Soviet press reports last September confirmed that a mass flight of Chinese across the Sino-Soviet border had in fact taken place, adding further lurid details which contradicted the Peking version.

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28 Statement of the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, Feb. 10, 1963, reported by Hanoi Radio, same date.
29 CPSU Open Letter of July 13, 1963: in Pravda same date.
30 JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.
32 JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.
33 E.g., see Kazakhstanskiaia Pravda, Sept. 29, 1963. The Soviet government statement of Sept. 20, 1963, claimed that there had been 5,000 Chinese violations of the Soviet border in 1962.
Renewal of Hostilities

At the end of the summer of 1962, the Chinese fired the opening salvos in a renewed anti-Soviet campaign which has gone on continuously ever since. On three separate occasions, at the Romanian (August 23), Vietnamese (September 1), and Bulgarian (September 8) national anniversary receptions held in Peking, Foreign Minister Chen Yi alluded to socialist countries which attempted to forcibly impose ... [their] views on others" and "replaced comradelike discussions ... with interference in [others'] internal affairs." Soon afterwards, in mid-September, the Chinese and Albanian press launched an obviously coordinated and violent assault on "modern revisionism," timed to coincide with the visit of Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Yugoslavia.

Curiously, Soviet propaganda displayed remarkable restraint as the Chinese attacks continued, and there was even an attempt to appease Peking. In meetings with the departing Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsiao on October 13 and 14, Khrushchev, according to Soviet statements last year, asked that Mao forget the past and "start our relations with a clear page." Moreover, according to the Chinese, the Soviet leader expressed complete sympathy for Peking's stand on the border conflict with India, implicitly endorsing the Chinese intention to use force in that conflict, and promised to stand by Peking if hostilities again arose.

These private statements by Khrushchev were followed on October 25 by an equally remarkable editorial in Pravda which, for the first and last time in the three years of the Sino-Indian border controversy, sided with Peking. One can only speculate that the adoption by Moscow of a conciliatory posture was motivated by the approach of the Cuban crisis, which erupted into the open on October 22—that is, by Soviet desire to assure bloc solidarity at a time of military crisis and also, perhaps, to buy Chinese forbearance if it should become necessary to back down over the issue of Cuba.

As it turned out, the Soviets did have to back down, but the Chinese did not forbear and instead proceeded to belabor Khrushchev unmercifully for his "betrayal" of Castro. Placed on the defensive, Moscow edged back toward its previous neutral position vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian border conflict and then organized a thoroughgoing counterattack against the Chinese party.

The counterattack was pressed with mounting intensity throughout November and the first week of December at the successive congresses of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Italian Communist parties, each of these meetings witnessing the dragooning of a still larger number of the CPSU's foreign adherents into joining a chorus of denunciation first against the Albanians and later against the Chinese as well. The climax was reached in early December with the extremely violent anti-Albanian-and-Chinese speeches delivered by the Czechoslovak and Italian party secretaries, Koucky and Pajetta. There followed the elaborate state visit of Tito to the Soviet Union, where on December 12 the Yugoslav leader heard Khrushchev deliver an angry speech before the Supreme Soviet impugning Chinese motives and policies.

Mao's response was to open the sluice gates. In a succession of articles published between mid-December 1962 and March 1963, the CCP completed the process it had begun in 1956, gradually making explicit its past grievances and present ambitions. The Chinese party called on the Communists of the world to revolt against the "baton" of the CPSU; it derided the Soviet "temporary majority"; and it challenged Moscow to convene a meeting of the world movement, thus repeating publicly the demand made privately early in 1962. At last, Peking attacked, by name, the CPSU and its leading adherents in the West as betrayers of the revolution, simultaneously elaborating its 1960 thesis that the real focus of revolutionary struggle against "imperialism" was now in the underdeveloped areas of the world and that the real leader of this struggle was the Chinese Communist Party.

In response, Moscow began in February 1963 to intimate that its adversary was seeking to divide the revolutionary movement along geographical and racial lines—a complaint which was eventually expanded into thunderous denunciations of Chinese "racism," coupled with charges that Peking was attempting to isolate the European "socialist" states from the "national liberation movement"
and to distort reality by claiming that imperialism's main conflict was now with the underdeveloped world (led by Peking's rhetoric) rather than with the bloc (led by Soviet military might).

In the meantime, however, it became clear early in 1963 that the Chinese public demand for a world Communist meeting had embarrassed the CPSU. In his January address to the East German party congress, Khrushchev not only proposed—as if it were his own idea—a suspension of polemics between the two factions, but also acknowledged the existence of pressure on him from "some comrades" to convene a world conference. He insisted, however, that the time was not ripe for such a meeting. The Soviet leader then went on to declare that he had no desire to excommunicate the Albanians from the bloc and challenged the Chinese to treat the Yugoslavs similarly. But even while extending this olive branch to Mao, Khrushchev could not forbear striking him with it: the East German congress was made the occasion for new attacks on the Albanians and the Chinese, and the CCP delegate was interrupted and subjected to apparently well-organized booing and hissing, an unprecedented insult to the Chinese party. Nevertheless, in February, the CPSU retreated a step further and sent Peking a fairly mild letter agreeing in principle to a world meeting and proposing bilateral talks to prepare for it.

The Chinese, however, were in no conciliatory mood and—as the Soviets later said—took Moscow's offer as a sign of weakness. They were by then in the midst of a vast new offensive against the CPSU and were vigorously proselytising in every part of the world. To this end, the various CCP statements and editorials were being assembled in brochures and distributed in many languages. In February, the Chinese openly attacked Soviet influence at a Tanganyika meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (using racial arguments, the Soviets said), and at the same time they began setting up counterparts to the existing world front organizations, excluding the Soviets from participation in the new bodies.

After receiving the CPSU letter of late February, the Chinese party responded with new public attacks of still greater violence. It was at this time that the CCP initiated the practice of publishing its current communications to the CPSU (forcing the Soviet party to do likewise), so that even the exchanges between the two Central Committees, hitherto kept in the form of confidential letters, now became a part of the open polemic. Thus, in spite of a promise given on March 9 that it would desist from further public attacks, Peking clearly had no intention of doing so.

### Moving Toward Schism

This was dramatically demonstrated on the eve of a CPSU Central Committee plenum and three weeks before the scheduled opening of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, when the Chinese distributed in the Soviet capital—and subsequently throughout the rest of the world—the CCP letter of June 14, 1963, explicitly indicting Soviet domestic policies for the first time and announcing Peking's intention to split every Communist party whose leadership continued to support Moscow. In this proclamation of Peking's "general line" for the Communists of the world, the Chinese also promised to anoint as honorary Marxists-Leninists all revolutionaries now outside the Communist movement who would carry their banner.

The Soviet leadership now reacted forcefully. The Chinese officials who had distributed the CCP letter in the Soviet Union were formally expelled, and after the Central Committee had pondered its course at the mid-June plenum, the Soviet case against the CCP was placed before the world in the form of a CPSU "Open Letter" released on July 13. A highly emotional speech delivered by Khrushchev six days later, on July 19, made it clear that he regarded the Chinese action as nothing less than an attempt to subvert his position at home and abroad.

Meanwhile, CPSU and CCP representatives opened their scheduled bilateral talks in Moscow, but even as the talks ground on toward eventual fruitless suspension, the Soviet government concluded a partial nuclear test-ban agreement with the United States on terms which it had previously rejected. Throughout the summer and autumn Soviet propaganda heavily exploited this agreement in an effort to isolate the Chinese, who were placed in the vulnerable position of having to defend before world opinion their determination to acquire nuclear weapons and their refusal to adhere to the test-ban treaty.

Sino-Soviet relations had now reached a point where both sides were caricaturing and attacking each other's leaders by name, and where both proceeded to publish statements revealing hitherto secret aspects of their dealings with each other since the beginning of the dispute. The Soviets spoke of Mao as a senile "Trotskyite" tyrant and racist who sought world war, who had made monumental blunders in domestic policy, and whose government maintained "concentration camps" and massacred minority peoples, forcing them to seek haven in the USSR. The Chinese, in turn, char-
acterized Khrushchev as a cowardly traitor allied with "imperialism" who was striving to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union and to undermine Marxism-Leninism throughout the world.

In September-October 1963 there were reports in the Western press, supported circumstantially by hints in Soviet propaganda, which suggested that the CPSU was almost reconciled to the consequences of a schism and was now considering the convocation of a world Communist meeting at which the Chinese and their supporters would be called upon to recant their factional activity or depart. In late October, however, the CPSU—apparently again under pressure from members of its own camp—temporarily abandoned this intention and instead began calling once again for an end to public polemics.

The CCP, however, would not relent, and by early January 1964 Peking had begun to announce formal recognition of pro-Chinese factions which had rebelled and seceded from the established Communist parties of such countries as Ceylon, Peru, Belgium, and Switzerland as the official Communist parties in those countries. These ominous organizational measures were followed in early February by a new Chinese pronouncement—the most outspoken to date—which proclaimed Peking's intention to recognize and support such "revolutionary" Communist parties everywhere.\(^{39}\)

The formalization of the worldwide Communist schism had now begun.

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\(^{38}\) Editorial article jointly published in *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Hung-Ch'i*, Feb. 4, 1964.

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**WHO AT THE HEAD?**

*Peking's Position*

First, we would like to ask the leaders of the CPSU: You say we want to seize the leadership. From whom? Who now holds the leadership? In the international Communist movement is there such a thing as leadership which lords it over all the fraternal parties? And is this leadership in your hands?

Apparently the leaders of the CPSU consider themselves the natural leaders, who can lord it over all the fraternal parties. According to their logic, their programs, resolutions, and statements are all infallible laws. Every remark and every word of Khrushchev's are imperial edicts, however wrong or absurd they may be. All the fraternal parties must submissively hear and obey and are absolutely forbidden to criticize or oppose them. This is outright tyranny. It is the ideology of feudal autocrats, pure and simple.

However, we must tell the CPSU leaders that the international Communist movement is not some feudal clique . . . The history of the international proletarian revolutionary movement shows that, owing to the uneven development of the revolution, at a particular historical stage the proletariat and its party in one country or another marched in the van of the movement . . . [But] even the vanguard position . . . does not remain unchanged for a long time, but shifts according to changing conditions. This shift is decided not by the subjective wishes of any individual or party, but by conditions shaped by history. If conditions change, other parties may come to the van of the movement. When a party which formerly held the position of vanguard takes the path of revisionism, it is bound to forfeit this position despite the fact that it has been the largest party and has exerted the greatest influence . . .

By embarking on the path of revisionism and splittism, the CPSU leaders automatically forfeited the position of "head" in the international Communist movement. If the word "head" is now to be applied to them, it can only mean that they are at the head of the revisionists and splitters.

*From Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i joint editorial article, Feb. 4, 1964.*
For almost a quarter century, from 1929 until 1953, international communism was characterized first and foremost by monolithic unity. All the Communist parties of the world (with the exception, since 1948, of the Yugoslav one) were subordinated to Stalin's leadership in Moscow. Every political shift of the Kremlin was obeyed by Communist parties from Germany to Indonesia. One nod from Moscow was all that was needed to remove a displeasing leader and to appoint a desirable one; one phrase in a Soviet article was enough to alter overnight the line of any party. The uniform monotony went so far that Communist Party resolutions of Sweden, Ceylon or Venezuela could hardly be distinguished one from the other. To be sure, during this period there existed, probably more than has been generally assumed until now, serious opposition to Soviet domination, criticism of the line handed down from Moscow, oppositionist currents and different concepts and controversies, but these could not be aired openly in the conditions prevailing at that time. In that quarter century the international Communist movement seemed—not only to the outside world, but even to many of its own members—like an instrument uniformly directed and led from Moscow, without any independence whatsoever.

All this now belongs to the past. Within a few years the Communist world movement has departed from its earlier monolithic structure to an astonishing extent and with startling swiftness. This development has led to the formation within the international Communist movement of several political groupings which take entirely different attitudes toward decisive political questions; it has led to open controversies between these different groupings and, consequently to new relations within the movement as a whole. The purpose of this article is to describe and assess this process, especially with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, which may be said to have been one of its major catalysts. It is of course impossible within the scope of a single article to describe this process in full, but some of the main stages and “focal points” can be mentioned so as to give us an idea of the extent and limits of the changes and perhaps some clues to the future evolution of the international Communist movement.

The basic causes for the “decentralization” of world communism lie chiefly, in this author’s opinion, in the fact that the function and type of organization of the movement as created and